金融業提列備抵呆帳及股利發放對盈餘之訊號效果：以亞洲11個國家上市商業銀行為例

過去文獻對於股利訊號或備抵呆帳之訊號效果有許多著墨，但是卻少有研究同時探討股利的發放與備抵呆帳之提列，對於獲利之訊號效果是否成立。本文以11個亞洲國家的上市商業銀行為樣本，樣本期間為2001年至 2009年。


實證結果顯示：(1)股利發放與獲利之間呈現正向關係，顯示亞洲上市商業銀行的股利訊號效果成立。(2) 而備抵呆帳提列與獲利之間呈現顯著的負向關係，顯示反向的備抵呆帳訊號效果成立。(3)至於考慮股利發放與備抵呆帳的交互作用，發現其係數為顯著正數，顯示股利發放會降低提列備抵呆帳費用效果之負向關係。

Signaling hypothesis predicts that information asymmetry exists between managers and outside investor. Banks’ managers intend to signal favorable future earnings prospects through the dividend announces and loan loss provisioning. Prior study has focused either on the signaling effect of dividend or loan loss provisioning. Nevertheless, to the author’s best knowledge, this is the first study tries to discuss dividend signaling, as well as loan loss provisioning.


Empirical results confirm the dividends and loan loss provision do have their impact on banks’ earning, which are demonstrated as follows. Firstly, dividends are positively associated with an increase of profitability, implying that the hypothesis of dividend signaling holds. Secondly, the relationship of loan loss provision and earning is negatively related with significance, indicating that the reverse signaling effect of loan loss provision stands. Third, this study further considers the interaction effect between dividend and LLP. The coefficients of the interaction terms are mostly significantly positive. Hence, the increase of dividend will weaken the negative relationship of loan loss provision signaling effect.